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Introduction 
 
 
Struggling to Build an Alternative 
to Assad 
Structural Flaws and Lack of Protection Undermine Syria’s Opposition Government 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
International powers backing the Syrian opposition are turning their attention to an 
Interim Government founded in November 2013. The February 2014 collapse of the 
Geneva peace talks, which were supposed to produce a political transition, and growing 
alarm over chaos in rebel areas and gains by hard-line Islamists, have prompted renew-
ed efforts to help the opposition fill the vacuum left by the collapse of central author-
ity in large parts of Syria. Yet, the new entity has had little impact on the ground. Nor 
does the sacking of its first prime minister after only months bode well for its indepen-
dence. In addition, regime strikes, opposition infighting, and a fundamental lack of 
security will lead to failure unless the opposition is revamped and a military umbrella 
created to allow it to govern inside Syria. 
 
Syria’s divided opposition has failed to 
provide an alternative to President Bashar 
al-Assad since the outbreak of the revolt 
against his rule in March 2011. The creation 
of the Western- and Arab-backed National 
Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Op-
position Forces (the Coalition) in November 
2012 did little to improve the situation. A 
power struggle between Qatari- and Saudi-
backed blocs swiftly emerged and has 
since become chronic. The Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Coalition’s best organized 
faction, ended up holding the balance be-
tween the two wings. Addressing demands 
to provide basic services in areas outside 
Assad’s control became secondary to inter-
nal politicking. Under international pres-
sure, the Coalition sent a delegation to 
represent the opposition at the doomed 
Geneva peace talks in January 2014. It has 
managed little else in the way of coherent 
strategy to counter gains by the Assad 
regime and the rising influence of al-Qaeda 
and its Islamic State (IS) offshoot, formerly 
known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL). Moderate rebels, loosely gather-
ed under the Free Syrian Army (FSA) ban-
ner, have been left controlling pockets in 
northern Syria, areas around Damascus and 
Homs, and the southern province of Deraa. 
Technocrats to the Rescue? 
Lacking military might, the Coalition set 
up an Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) 
to coordinate humanitarian work with the  
 Khaled Yacoub Oweis is a fellow in the project „The fragmentation of Syria. Halting the slide towards a failed state“ SWP Comments 35 
 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and funded by the German Foreign Office. July 2014 
1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
international community, but political 
interference and allegations of corruption 
have undermined its operations, prompting 
calls for a technocratic opposition Interim 
Government to fill the basic services and 
administrative vacuum in areas outside 
Assad’s control. 
Disagreements between the Qatari- and 
Saudi-backed blocs prevented the formation 
of an Interim Government until the pro-
Saudi bloc took control of the Coalition 
in mid-2013, following an expansion that 
almost doubled the Coalition’s General 
Assembly membership to 123. Sensing the 
change in the regional mood, the Muslim 
Brotherhood backed the Coalition’s en-
largement, which diluted its outright num-
bers, but positioned it as a kingmaker. 
Western powers, irked by Qatar’s support 
for militant Islamist forces and dominance 
over Coalition politics, had pushed for the 
expansion. The weakening of the Qatari 
faction opened the way for the election of 
Ahmad Jarba, a Saudi-backed tribal figure, 
as President of the Coalition in July 2013. 
Although Jarba’s term expired in July 
2014 when he was succeeded by his confi-
dant Hadi al-Bahra, Jarba has remained the 
most powerful member of the Coalition. 
Bahra’s appointment was apparently the 
outcome of a power-sharing deal that left 
the Coalition’s presidency with the Saudi 
wing but gave the Qatari faction the posi-
tion of secretary-general and one of the 
three vice-presidents. 
Ignoring its own public statements 
about the need for technocrats, the Coali-
tion eventually in November 2013 named a 
ten-person Interim Government comprised 
largely of political appointees owing alle-
giance to various power brokers. The cabi-
net broadly mirrored the de facto regional 
and ethnic/confessional make-up of the 
Coalition, as well as a strong Islamist slant 
that the Coalition retained despite the 
inclusion of secular figures in its 2013 ex-
pansion. At least four ministers out of the 
nine remaining after the forced May 2014 
resignation of Defense Minister Asaad 
Mustafa are linked to the Muslim Brother-
hood, which was also awarded key advisory 
positions and a large share of the secretari-
at. International donors have been eager for 
the Interim Government to propose viable 
projects for financing. But regional and 
political affiliation has become the major 
hiring criterion, risking incompetence and 
undermining the Interim Government’s 
claim to be technocratic. 
The response to the establishment of the 
Interim Government was lukewarm. Given 
that it was announced in the run-up to the 
U.S.- and Russian-sponsored Geneva talks 
which were supposed to produce a transi-
tional authority formed jointly by the op-
position and the regime, Russia saw it as 
 
Opposition Players 
Ahmad Jarba: Saudi Arabia’s point man 
in the opposition. A tribal figure, Jarba 
has good ties with the majority Kurds in 
his home region of northeastern Syria. He 
was instrumental in bringing the Kurdish 
National Council, a grouping of Kurdish 
parties that excludes the PYD, into the 
Coalition. 
Mustafa al-Sabbagh: A businessman with 
strong connections to Qatar, Sabbagh’s 
influence strengthened in July 2014 after 
striking an implicit power-sharing deal 
with Jarba that split senior Coalition posts 
between the Saudi- and Qatari-backed 
wings, and resulted in the sacking of 
Ahmad Tomeh, the interim prime minis-
ter who belonged to neither of the two 
camps. 
Ahmed Tomeh: A former political pris-
oner from the province of Deir al-Zor, 
Tomeh’s history of working equally with 
Islamist and secular opposition figures 
helped him become interim prime minis-
ter. But he exhibited a streak of indepen-
dence that got him sacked. A moderate 
Islamist, Tomeh broke an opposition 
taboo after taking office by harshly criti-
cizing al-Qaeda and describing it as being 
as repressive as the Assad regime. 
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 undermining the Geneva conference while 
the United States did not want to appear to 
be endangering the talks. 
Without a clear mandate, the Interim 
Government has become embroiled in 
feuds with the Coalition that have deepen-
ed funding shortages. Its first interim prime 
minister, the moderate Islamist Ahmad 
Tomeh, tried to steer an independent course 
and was sacked along with his cabinet in 
July 2014. Whoever replaces him will also 
have to deal with a patchwork of local, and 
often rival, organizations in rebel-held 
areas that have been trying to compensate 
for the collapse of municipal services. These 
groups, operating as local administrative 
councils or relief bodies, often receive fi-
nancial support from foreign governments, 
international aid groups, Syrian expatri-
ates and opposition actors, most notably 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Mustafa al-
Sabbagh, a central Coalition player linked 
to Qatar. 
Weakened by political spats and Tomeh’s 
sacking, the Interim Government will strug-
gle not to fall under the thumb of the Coali-
tion. Tomeh worked to keep lines of com-
munication open with both Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar, so as to build a constituency in-
side Syria without falling victim to the 
rivalry between the two backers. Millions 
of people in rebel areas are having to cope 
mostly unaided with dire living conditions, 
made worse by regime bombardment and 
jihadist advances. An exile opposition lead-
ership largely disconnected from the grass-
roots and territorial conflicts between 
various rebel brigades that exacerbate the 
collapse of security have only worsened 
the malaise. 
With the external opposition largely 
discredited on the ground, the Interim 
Government’s relationship with local com-
munities will depend on the extent to 
which it is seen as promoting local leaders 
who have experienced repression and re-
gime attacks. One early test came when 
Othman al-Bediwi, minister for local ad-
ministration, relief, and refugees, began 
his tenure by attempting to streamline the 
local administrative councils, which num-
ber some seven hundred across rebel-held 
territory. These councils have struggled to 
operate independently of rebel brigades 
that have established their own fiefdoms. 
The chaos is acute in regions of low-inten-
sity warfare in Aleppo and Idlib gover-
norates, where rebel brigades have become 
more interested in carving out territory 
than fighting Assad’s forces. Bediwi sacked 
several councils and organized new elec-
tions for others. Inside Syria, the move was 
largely seen as political interference, and 
Bediwi’s meetings with local activists have 
therefore been stormy. But the latter re-
luctantly went along with the changes, 
hoping they would result in an inflow of 
project funding. The continuing working 
relationship between the two sides will 
depend on the Interim Government’s abili-
ty to deliver. 
Hesitant Patrons 
The task of the opposition government is 
complicated by its relationship with the 
Coalition, which claims to represent the 
Syrian nation but has neither acted as a pro-
visional parliament nor produced a strong 
command. Instead, the Coalition has emerg-
ed as a hodgepodge of competing interests 
with little focus on how to depose Assad. 
There are no institutional guidelines gov-
erning the relationship or dividing powers 
between the Coalition and the Interim Gov-
ernment. Indeed, the Coalition can choose 
at will to table a no-confidence vote, as it 
did in July 2014. This subjects the Interim 
Government to the constant risk of being 
made a scapegoat for a largely discredited 
opposition. 
The Interim Government, which is based 
in the southern Turkish city of Gaziantep, 
initially received $1.5 million in financing 
from the Coalition before the relationship 
between the two sides deteriorated. The 
only other funding has been a €50 million 
($68.2 million) grant from Qatar in Decem-
ber 2013. Most of the Qatari funds were 
spent on paying salaries, especially to teach-
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 ers inside Syria, and on small projects, such 
as building wells, providing artificial limbs, 
and repairing cell towers and electricity 
lines, mainly in northern Syria. Up to €12 
million in handouts went to FSA brigades 
to co-opt them into supporting the Interim 
Government’s operations and its stated goal 
of moving its headquarters to northern 
Syria. 
Although supplying funding, the Interim 
Government has had little influence on the 
rebels on the ground. No framework for co-
operation with the FSA has been achieved. 
Its command, the Supreme Military Coun-
cil, underwent several power struggles 
before falling largely under the influence 
of Jarba at the beginning of 2014. 
Tensions with the Coalition inevitably 
grew as the international spotlight fell on 
the Interim Government. Tomeh was in-
vited to address a Friends of Syria meeting 
in London in May 2014, which infuriated 
Jarba and was seen by some in the Coalition 
as infringing on its foreign policy powers. 
The Friends of Syria officially include more 
than one hundred countries supporting the 
Syrian opposition. The core group of eleven 
active members who hold regular meetings 
comprises Turkey, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates, and Jordan, as well as Egypt, which 
forced most of the Syrian opposition to 
leave its territory after the ouster of Presi-
dent Mohammad Morsi in July 2013. 
Reluctant to cede influence, the Coali-
tion has kept afloat its own Assistance Coor-
dination Unit (ACU) and has not followed 
through on a decision by its leadership 
committee to attach the ACU to the Interim 
Government. The ACU has come under alle-
gations of corruption and its head, Osama 
al-Qadi, who is close to the Muslim Brother-
hood, quit in June 2014. Qadi, who denied 
any wrongdoing, was subsequently ap-
pointed assistant for economic affairs to 
the interim prime minister, in an indica-
tion of the Brotherhood’s influence over 
the Interim Government. The subsequent 
appointment of a new head raised hopes of 
an end to graft and political interference in 
the organization, but the ACU’s unresolved 
status and its separate existence alongside 
the Interim Government poses a dilemma 
for international donors who were hoping 
to see a streamlining of aid. 
Entrenched Regime 
The Coalition might be in a position to 
afford bickering or poor governance if it 
was facing a weak regime, or if it enjoyed 
the kind of strong support from allies that 
Assad does. But the opposition has had no 
answer to Assad’s political and battlefield 
gains. In mid-2014, rapid advances by the 
Islamic State across eastern Syria and Iraq, 
and the prospect of the United States coor-
dinating (however implicitly) with Iran to 
reverse the group’s advances in Iraq, have 
strengthened Assad’s claim to be a bulwark 
against terrorism. 
That message was also central to the 
presidential elections held in June 2014 in 
the midst of raging conflict and against the 
will of much of the international commu-
nity. The ballot took place in areas under 
regime control, mainly the centre of the 
country, the coast, and parts of the prov-
inces of Hama and Aleppo north of Damas-
cus. With the cooperation of the Democ-
ratic Union Party (PYD), which has close 
links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK), polling stations were also set up in 
the mostly Kurdish northeast. 
Predictably, Assad won a third seven-year 
term, extending four decades of dynastic 
rule based on ceremonial ballots but under-
pinned by a security apparatus dominated 
by his minority Alawite group. Assad offi-
cially gained 88.7 percent of the vote, com-
pared with 97.6 percent in a 2007 referen-
dum and 99.7 percent when he inherited 
power from his father, the late Hafez al-
Assad, in 2000. In a nod to an election law 
adopted in March 2014 that allowed multi-
ple candidates for the first time since Assad 
family rule began in 1970, two other con-
tenders were allowed to run. Neither criti-
cized Assad or the crackdown. Most of the 
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 opposition boycotted the elections, includ-
ing the secular National Coordination Body 
for Democratic Change (NCB), which the 
regime had previously described as “patri-
otic opposition.” 
Official turnout was 73 percent, but 
anecdotal evidence and witness accounts 
of empty polling stations whenever state 
television cameras left the scene suggest far 
smaller participation, comprising mainly 
Alawite loyalists, other minorities, and 
government workers traditionally coerced 
to vote. After the elections, prominent NCB 
members were banned from leaving Syria. 
The ballot all but destroyed the 2012 Geneva 
framework for a transitional authority and 
set the scene for prolongation of the mili-
tary stalemate, thus increasing the pressure 
on the opposition to come up with a work-
ing administrative alternative of its own in 
the areas outside Assad’s control. 
Islamist Ascendancy 
During the course of 2013 and the first 
half of 2014, most territory outside regime 
control, except in the southern province 
of Deraa, fell to three hardline groups: the 
Salafist Islamic Front, the al-Qaeda-linked 
al-Nusra Front, and the al-Qaeda breakaway 
Islamic State. The Islamic Front has a strong 
presence in the northern provinces of Alep-
po and Idlib near the border with Turkey 
and appears to be influenced by Qatar, and 
to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia. Its coopera-
tion, or at least non-interference, would be 
crucial for the opposition government’s 
plans to concentrate on northern Syria as 
the most accessible region to service. 
The Islamic Front has been under pres-
sure. Its links with al-Qaeda apparently 
prompted a drop in funding from the Gulf 
from the beginning of 2014. In May 2014, 
Turkey and Qatar nudged the Islamic Front 
into adopting a “code of honor” that avoids 
the harsh jihadist rhetoric that has become 
the hallmark of the insurgency, and makes 
no mention of imposition of an Islamic 
state. The Islamic Front took over an oppo-
sition local council in the northern prov-
ince of Idlib in mid-2014 after hearing that 
it was due to receive $1.5 million from the 
Interim Government. 
The more dogmatic Islamic State has 
proven a much more difficult, and deadlier, 
challenge for the Western-backed opposi-
tion. The al-Qaeda offshoot is mostly led by 
foreign jihadists. In early 2014, it took con-
trol of large areas in the eastern province 
of Raqqa, partly compensating for losses in 
neighbouring Aleppo to an alliance of con-
venience comprising the Nusra Front, the 
Islamic Front, and some FSA units. Having 
secured a local tribal base in Raqqa, the 
Islamic State then expanded into the oil-
producing province of Deir al-Zor, which 
borders Iraq’s Sunni heartland. One of the 
highlights of the Islamic State’s lightning 
desert advance was its seizure in July 2014 
of the large al-Omar oilfield, previously in 
the hands of the Nusra Front. In Iraq, the 
Islamic State spearheaded a June 2014 take-
over of the northern city of Mosul, which 
has historic links with Aleppo. Islamic State 
formations have been pushed to the east of 
Aleppo but remain a threat to other opposi-
tion forces, with “sleeper cells” in the city 
and elsewhere in the province. The inter-
national spotlight on this group helped 
Assad portray himself as a bulwark against 
extremism and chaos. 
At the same time, the Coalition has fail-
ed to build any semblance of an alternative 
administration in regions that fell to the 
opposition as far back as 2012. Services 
supplied by the new Interim Government, 
such as restoring wells, repairing electricity 
lines, and delivering food are only starting 
to trickle into FSA-held areas, mainly in the 
north. This contrasts with other areas out 
of Assad’s control. 
In the east, the Islamic State has largely 
left local councils and government workers, 
who still receive salaries from the regime 
(for example at the hydroelectric dam at 
Tabaqa) to do their work. International food 
aid is reaching Raqqa and a major polio im-
munization program relying on local vol-
unteers was also conducted in the region. 
While the Islamic State is suspected of 
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 killing and kidnapping several members 
of opposition local councils who spoke out 
against its violent methods and harsh im-
position of its interpretation of Islamic law, 
it has been co-opting at least part of the 
local population by defeating rebel brigades 
tarnished by a reputation for lawlessness 
and theft. The group has also been able to 
provide fuel by virtue of its seizure of oil 
and gas fields and other energy infrastruc-
ture and is showing deference to the 
prestige and communal authority of the 
region’s tribal leaders. 
PYD regions in the northeast have seen 
the most efficient administration due to an 
infrastructure that has largely remained 
intact, good ties between the PYD and Assad 
and the organizational skills of Kurdish 
parties which, unlike the rest of the oppo-
sition, had been allowed to operate under 
Assad’s rule. The PYD declared self-rule in 
the Kurdish areas of northeast Syria at the 
beginning of 2014. The Coalition, noting 
that Arabs also live in the region, denounc-
ed the move as compromising Syria’s unity. 
The Recovery Trust Fund  
Prospects of the opposition receiving wide-
ranging help to match the support that the 
regime enjoys from Russia and Iran have 
diminished as Assad’s foes have failed to 
unite and jihadists have all but taken over 
the battlefield. Struggling to define their 
policy toward Syria, Western countries have 
opted for more modest backing.  
With the conflict dragging on, a fund set 
up originally for reconstruction by Germa-
ny and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has 
become a test bed for a new approach 
focused on improving daily lives. Adminis-
tered by Germany’s KFW development bank, 
the Syria Recovery Trust Fund (the Fund) 
has received €85 million out of €100 mil-
lion pledged as of mid-July 2014. Eight 
projects costing €8.5 million in the fields 
of health, water, and energy have been ap-
proved. The Fund aims to alleviate the 
“immediate suffering” of civilians in rebel 
areas by ensuring supplies of water, fuel, 
medicine, and food. The Coalition signed a 
framework agreement for the Fund in Ber-
lin in September 2013. Its steering com-
mittee consists of Germany, Japan, Kuwait, 
the UAE, and the United States. The main 
contributors are Germany (€18.6 million), 
the United Arab Emirates (€10 million), 
the United States (€10.9 million), as well as 
the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, and 
Denmark. 
The Fund could help reverse the bleak 
picture on the ground if it is integrated 
into a wider strategy of supporting a tech-
nocratic opposition structure that contrasts 
with the free-wheeling style of the Coali-
tion. Yet, while Fund operators aim to keep 
their relationship mostly with the Interim 
Government, it will be difficult to shield 
delivery of services and projects from the 
chaotic politics of the opposition and inter-
ference by Coalition members, unless the 
Interim Government is strengthened. 
Security Risks 
The Interim Government estimates it needs 
to employ some ten thousand people to 
function as a basic services organization. 
Transferring the headquarters a few kilo-
meters south, just inside Syria, would bring 
the Interim Government closer to its con-
stituency and help convince Syrians and 
international aid agencies that opposition 
leaders, who mostly live in exile, are willing 
to share risks. Twenty international aid 
staff have been killed in rebel-held parts of 
Syria since the beginning of the revolt. 
Indeed, the Interim Government has sent 
dozens of employees into Syria, yet without 
any protection. An air strike on the Aleppo 
local council office, which began cooperat-
ing with the Interim Government, killed 
one council member and wounded several 
others in April 2014. An ambulance bought 
with Fund money was destroyed in another 
strike on the city. In general, Assad’s forces 
have not shied away from using planes and 
missiles to hit targets right on the border. 
In addition, the Islamic State, which still 
has bases in Aleppo province, and to a less-
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 er degree the Nusra Front, remain major 
threats. Hundreds of ambulances sent to 
Syria by international and Syrian donors 
in 2013–2014, including four bought by 
the opposition government with Qatari 
assistance, have been seized by various 
rebel groups and converted into fighting 
vehicles. 
Securing supplies and services amidst a 
multitude of armed groups in rebel areas 
would not only necessitate agreements 
with the Islamic Front and other rebel 
brigades. It would also require a several-
thousand-strong force, putting the onus on 
the opposition and its backers to train a 
unified military arm capable of fulfilling 
basic protection tasks after years of toying 
with different military structures. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
A new international formula to provide 
basic services in rebel-held parts of Syria is 
needed. It should combine cooperation 
with the opposition government, a clari-
fication of mandates, measures to improve 
transparency, and a framework for military 
protection. 
Clarification of mandates: Service deliv-
ery and aid projects will continue to suffer 
if the Interim Government is not granted 
sufficient autonomy to operate separately 
from the Coalition and avoid becoming 
mired in the allegations of nepotism and 
corruption that have afflicted the opposi-
tion. Since the Geneva talks, the West has 
been wary of intervening in Coalition poli-
tics. But with donor cash at stake, the West 
should use its influence to cajole the oppo-
sition into getting behind the Interim 
Government rather than turning it ever 
more into a tool of Coalition politics. 
Having sent advisers to help the Interim 
Government in Gaziantep, Germany should 
propose a clear institutional framework 
and concise job descriptions for ministerial 
portfolios. A clearer structure could allay 
Coalition fears of the Interim Government 
encroaching on its authority, and convince 
international donors to deal with the Inter-
im Government instead of channelling aid 
through a plethora of local councils, activ-
ists’ organizations, and middlemen. That 
would also include achieving a balance 
between preserving local structures and 
imposing central control. 
Indeed, the Coalition should become 
more of a provisional parliament, leaving 
administration to the Interim Government. 
A parliamentary structure with committees 
and open debate would help define the 
largely arbitrary relationship that has de-
veloped between the Coalition and the 
Interim Government. In turn, the cabinet 
would need to instil a merit-based culture 
among its staff and stop the wave of politi-
cal hirings, particularly for advisory and 
leadership posts, which has done little to 
enhance its reputation and handling of 
projects. 
Increasing transparency: A major criti-
cism of Coalition power-brokers has been 
that they have received millions of dollars 
in Gulf money without revealing how the 
cash was spent. A website detailing all 
sources of government financing, including 
Fund money, where the cash is going, and 
at what stage project completion stands 
would help to improve the political atmo-
sphere. The site could eventually include a 
database about local needs and priorities 
collected by councils in hundreds of towns 
and villages. 
Redressing the military imbalance: 
A U.S. announcement in June 2014 of some 
$500 million for an opposition military 
build-up could be used to give the Interim 
Government protection, provided the effort 
does not result in the creation of even more 
disparate militias interested more in ex-
panding their territory than building a 
national rebel force. Support would there-
fore have to be attached to criteria concern-
ing recruitment and hierarchy so as to curb 
corruption and political interference.  
The new U.S. strategy appears aimed at 
making the Hazm movement, a new group-
ing of Islamist brigades that do not sub-
scribe to al-Qaeda ideology, the nucleus of 
a northern military force. If the group 
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 manages to rise above the corruption and 
gang mentality that have all but fatally 
damaged the military struggle against 
Assad, it could indeed support a lighter 
policing force of five thousand proposed by 
the Interim Government to handle tasks 
such as escorting transport convoys and 
guarding depots. 
Working around political limitations: 
Even a robust opposition force would not 
be able to prevent the barrel bombs, ballis-
tic missiles, and heavy artillery that the re-
gime has used as weapons of terror against 
civilian targets. An effective but politically 
risky Western response would be an Iraq-
style no-fly zone imposed by NATO and the 
extension of its missile shield stationed 
in Turkey to prevent ballistic weapons 
launched from deep within regime terri-
tory from hitting rebel population centres. 
Yet, with a reluctant United States, and 
al-Qaeda muddying the lines of battle, such 
a scenario has become politically impossi-
ble. Other ways have to be found to rob 
Assad of the freedom he has had to target 
civilians since the start of the conflict. Reb-
el brigades have also been using smaller 
weapons that indiscriminately kill and 
injure civilians in regime areas. 
One approach could be to emulate the 
1996 April Understanding between Israel 
and Hezbollah in South Lebanon, mediated 
by the United States and France, which 
brought civilian casualties down sharply by 
committing both sides to attack only mili-
tary targets outside built-up areas. A group 
consisting of representatives of France, the 
United States, Lebanon, Israel, and Syria 
monitored compliance and met to examine 
complaints. A Western diplomatic push 
would be needed to get Russia on board for 
a similar effort to protect civilians and 
create safe zones with the consent of the 
Assad regime, the opposition, and their 
respective backers. Unlike previous efforts 
to protect civilians, a deal similar to the 
April Understanding would not involve the 
kind of provisions Russia has shied away 
from, such as threats to Assad’s position or 
threats to use UN-approved force. Rather it 
would signal Russian and U.S. willingness 
to put their diplomatic weight behind an 
agreement that both could take credit for if 
it were to bring down the level of violence. 
Germany should use its ties with Moscow to 
narrow the differences between Russia and 
the United States. A major difference be-
tween Lebanon-Israel and the Syrian case 
would, of course, be the actual presence of 
UN peacekeepers on the ground, who were 
in Lebanon when the April Understanding 
was reached and reported on infringements 
first hand. However, monitoring of an un-
derstanding for an initial area in northern 
Syria could possibly be conducted from 
Turkey. 
As far as other players are concerned, 
pressure by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Tur-
key on hard-line Islamist groups would 
be needed to make such a deal work. The 
Islamic Front has already signalled political 
flexibility by adopting, at least rhetorically, 
a new code of honor. The position of the 
Nusra Front could be influenced by Qatar, 
which in March 2014 mediated a hostage-
exchange deal involving nuns captured by 
the Front in the town of Maaloula. Still, it is 
far from certain whether Qatar actually has 
sufficient leverage. The Islamic State will 
likely aim to foil any concerted interna-
tional effort at protecting civilians, which 
would leave it as the only major faction in 
the conflict not committed to limiting the 
war. At the same time, if nothing is done to 
stop indiscriminate regime strikes against 
the population, the jihadists will continue 
to recruit successfully in Syria. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2014 
All rights reserved 
These Comments reflect  
solely the author’s views. 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 
International and  
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone  +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax  +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
SWP Comments 35 
July 2014 
8 
